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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 16, 1987

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TO: William H. Webster
Director
of Central Intelligence

FROM: C - Max M. Kampelman

SUBJECT: INF Verification: A Current Status Report

Summary

Although a number of differences remain to be worked out in Geneva, substantial agreement has already been reached with the Soviets on verification. The Soviets have accepted the basic elements of the U.S.-proposed treaty regime providing for limiting INF missiles to deployment areas, an exchange and regular updates of data, verification of the elimination process, several categories of on-site inspection, and noninterference with national technical means. Large chunks of the INF treaty dealing with verification have been agreed and good progress is being made on the details in the annexes, some of which the U.S. only tabled recently. Key verification issues remaining include: whether to permit on-site inspection of former INF facilities in basing countries or only on U.S./Soviet territory, the exception regime for research and development booster stages, and whether to permit on-site inspection in ICBM (U.S.-proposed) and SLCM (Soviet-proposed) production facilities. The delegation believes that once agreement in principle is reached on remaining substantive issues, the brackets in the existing treaty text and annexes can be resolved expeditiously. After a long period in which the Soviets lagged behind in discussing verification specifics, the U.S. delegation finds the Soviets in recent weeks workman-like and willing to engage on the issues. End summary.

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Agreed Points on INF Verification

The Soviets have agreed with the main elements of the U.S.-proposed verification regime, including agreement on a joint draft treaty text with respect to deployment areas, a notification regime, noninterference with NTM, and the elimination process. The Soviets agree on the concept of an exchange of data and regular updates thereof, and a large measure of agreement has been reached on the categories of data in the MOU on data annex, although the numbers for the categories have not yet been exchanged. With respect to on-site inspection, the Soviets have accepted the concept and four of the five U.S.-proposed categories of inspection, namely baseline inspection, declared facilities inspection, inspection of the elimination process, and some form of suspect site inspection. They reject the fifth category of U.S.-proposed on-site inspection, a "close out inspection," as redundant.

Verification Issues Not Yet Agreed

Issues which are not yet agreed include:

-- Suspect site inspection. The Soviets retain their vague requirement to inspect "deployment areas" (which they refuse to define) and U.S. military facilities in third countries (which they refuse to specify). The delegation believes that the Soviets retain this language for bargaining purposes and that the real on-site inspection issue reduces itself to a juxtaposition between the U.S. proposal to inspect GLBM facilities over 500 kms. and selected formerly declared facilities in U.S. and Soviet territory (only) versus a Soviet proposal to inspect formerly declared facilities in U.S. and basing countries;

-- Whether main operating bases and test ranges will be among the list of formerly declared facilities subject to inspection;

-- Whether the Soviets will continue to insist on inspection of U.S. SLCM production facilities as a counter to the U.S. position (which the Soviets strongly criticize) to inspect ICBM production facilities.

Larger Issues Not Yet Agreed Which Have a Verification Impact

Several other issues not yet agreed which have a verification impact include:

-- Launch to destroy. The Soviets continue to insist that some missiles be eliminated via launch to destruction;

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-- Stages. The Soviets insist that while the U.S. must destroy all Pershing II missile stages, there is no need for the Soviets to eliminate SS-20 stages, since they produce SS-20's only whole in canisters. The delegation believes the Soviets may use SS-20 missile stages (or something very similar) for other purposes, possibly the SS-25;

-- Booster exception. The Soviets have accepted the concept recently introduced by the United States of providing for an exception from the elimination requirement for research and development booster stages. However, they reject the U.S. requirement that R&D boosters will be subject to notification requirement and on-site inspection upon testing;

-- Data timing. The Soviets have lately indicated they believe the initial exchange of data should take place only later (close to treaty signature) rather than earlier as the U.S. proposes.

In sum the Soviets have, since the Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting in Washington in September, been much more workmanlike and willing to engage on the issues than previously. They now deal in specifics, and in a few cases their verification regime goes farther than the U.S., although some of this is no doubt bargaining leverage.

Despite a late start in tabling some of the annexes, the pace has been steady and a good deal of progress made. The treaty text on verification is in large part agreed. The MOU on data is close to agreement in format, although the numbers have yet to be filled in. The elimination protocol should be helped along by the experts discussion currently in progress in Geneva. The delegation believes that once two key questions are answered -- how long the elimination process will take, and whether launch to destruction will be permitted -- agreement can be reached on the text fairly easily. On the inspection protocol tabled only a few weeks ago, the Soviets have accepted many, but not all, of the categories and procedures for inspection and the sides are close to a joint draft text. The single largest technical issue remaining on inspection is whether the Soviets will permit U.S. planes to transport inspectors to the inspection sites on Soviet territory or hold firm on their current insistence that U.S. inspectors must be transported on Soviet aircraft.

Finally, the privileges and immunities annex and the exchange of notes with basing countries documents tabled only very recently did not provoke hostile reaction from the Soviets. Work on these documents is continuing steadily although it appears preliminarily that some of the changes insisted upon by allies to reinforce the sovereignty principle are precisely the points upon which the Soviets may prove to be difficult.

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